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‘Losing the Peace: Euroscepticism and the foundations of 
contemporary English Nationalism.’ 
Dr Ben Wellings 
The Australian National University 
 
Submitted to Nations and Nationalism Themed Section on English 
Nationalism 
 
 
Political resistance to European integration in the United Kingdom laid important 
ideological foundations for contemporary English nationalism. The politics 
surrounding accession to the EEC was such that it signaled that accession was 
both a matter of supreme national importance and via the device of a referendum it 
led to the fusing of Parliamentary and popular sovereignty.  The unfolding of the 
Thatcherite project in Britain added an individualistic - and eventually an anti-
European - dimension to this nascent English nationalism.  Resistance to the 
deepening political and monetary integration of Europe, coupled with the effects of 
devolution in the United Kingdom, led to the emergence of a populist English 
nationalism, by now fundamentally shaped by opposition to European integration, 
although a nationalism which merged the defence of British and English 
sovereignty.  Underpinning these three developments was a popular version of the 
past which saw “Europe” as the ultimate institutional expression of British decline.  
Thus Euroscpeticism generated the ideology of contemporary English nationalism 
by legitimising the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty through the invocation of 
popular sovereignty underpinned by reference to the past. 
 
Keywords: England, Euroscepticism, sovereignty, populism, nationalism 
 
Introduction 
They key to understanding English nationalism is not to search for 
anything which expresses itself as distinctively English in the realm of 
politics.  This is because a central element of English nationalism is the 
defence of sovereignty – that is, the defence of the United Kingdom’s 
sovereignty.  Certainly there are some minor campaigns which seek to 
redress the asymmetric devolution of the United Kingdom, but the 
ideology of English nationalism is not generated in the main by this sort 
of resentment.  Although devolution played an important part in creating 
the structural conditions necessary to imagine England as a distinct 
political community, the ideological content of contemporary English 
nationalism is generated by opposition to European integration.  By 
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defending the United Kingdom’s sovereignty against the encroaching 
powers of the European Union, English nationalists often obscure 
English nationalism by defending Britain.  This is not to say that English 
nationalism is necessarily ‘quiescent’ or even ‘non-existent’, but rather 
that Euroscpeticism informs and illuminates nationalism in England, 
providing the ideological content of contemporary English nationalism.  
 
The argument that follows consists of three pillars, resting on a fourth 
foundation: 
1. The politics surrounding accession to the Common Market was 
such that it signaled that accession was both a matter of supreme 
national importance and – via the device of a referendum – led to 
the fusing of Parliamentary and popular sovereignty; 
2. The unfolding of the Thatcherite project in Britain added an 
individualistic and eventually an anti-European dimension to a 
nascent English nationalism; 
3. Resistance to the deepening political and monetary integration of 
Europe, coupled with the effects of devolution in the United 
Kingdom, led to the emergence of a populist English nationalism, 
by now fundamentally shaped by opposition to European 
integration. 
4. Underpinning the development and articulation of this anti-
European ideology was a popular version of the past which saw 
“Europe” as the ultimate institutional expression of British and 
English decline. 
 
The overall conclusion derived from the above is that political resistance 
to European integration laid important ideological foundations for 
contemporary English nationalism.  It did this by legitimising the defence 
of Parliamentary sovereignty through the invocation of popular 
sovereignty, popularly understood by reference to England’s past. 
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This emphasis on the ideological origins and construction of English 
nationalism differs from many recent approaches to Englishness.  
Political attention to English nationalism has been driven by the so-
called “English” or “West Lothian Question”: what sort of political powers 
should be accorded to England in an asymmetrically devolved United 
Kingdom?  At a popular level, this question seems to have been met with 
equanimity (see Susan Condor in this volume for an analysis of English 
reactions to devolution).  Explanations for this seeming quiescence are 
varied.  They range from research demonstrating that there is an active 
hostility to English identity amongst the young (Fenton, 2007); to the 
notion that England is imagined as a void or absence (Abell et al, 2007); 
or that English nationalism exists but dare not speak its name (McCrone, 
2006); or that it exists but it is politically weak (Bryant, 2008) and even 
to the notion that England is actually dead (Scruton, 2001).  Each of 
these explanations has merit – some more than others - yet many of 
these studies focus on what we might call English identity as opposed to 
English nationalism.  Kumar alone seeks to address the content of 
English nationalism, only to conclude that there never was anything 
resembling English nationalism until recently thereby inhibiting the 
development of a English national consciousness (Kumar, 2003).  
Anthony Smith has called for a longer-term historical analysis of English 
nationalism in the context of European unity (Smith, 2006) and this is 
an area which certainly needs to be further explored.  Only Gifford has 
examined the relationship between Euroscepticism and populism, but 
with an emphasis on Britain and its political economy (Gifford, 2008).  As 
I will argue below, resistance to European integration has laid the 
ideological foundations of a contemporary English nationalism by 
legitimising the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty through the 
invocation of popular sovereignty. 
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However, with one or two minor exceptions such as the Campaign for an 
English Parliament (CEP), the ideology of contemporary English 
nationalism is not explicitly borne by an understanding of politics, but is 
instead carried implicitly in an understanding of the past. An analysis of 
the role that arguments about the past – and lessons to be learned from 
them – played in resistance to European integration highlight the links 
between contemporary English nationalism and Euroscepticism.  But the 
dominant understanding of the past in England is a vision of history 
where the notion of “Greatness” has been torpedoed by perceptions of 
“Decline” in the post-War era – and “Europe” can be all too easily seen as 
the institutional expression of this fall from great power status 
 
I 
Debates about accession to the European Economic Community (EEC) in 
the 1960s and1970s (see for example Her Majesty’s Government 1971; 
Dewey, 2009) laid the foundations for the contemporary resurgence in 
English nationalism in two important ways.  Firstly, they rehearsed 
arguments about the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty whose 
continuity and importance could not truly be understood by 
Continentals.  Secondly, they fused the notion of Parliamentary 
sovereignty with that of popular sovereignty through the device of a 
referendum.   
 
This is not to say that other considerations did not contribute to a 
sceptical attitude towards European integration prior to the 1970s.  
Some of these objections were based on nothing more than prejudice and 
hearsay.  In a draft pamphlet, entitled Into the EEC? businessman A G 
Elliot argued against joining the EEC on the following grounds: 
 
I visited France on a 2,000 mile business trip and everywhere (except among the 
peasants) I found half the companies and people I dealt with tried to cheat me.  As 
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a recent television programme proved this sort of thing does not happen to foreign 
visitors to England…  and while I have spoken about the French, people tell me 
Italians are worse’ (Letter/pamphlet from A G Elliot to Shore, SHORE/9/44 
[Miscellaneous, 1971.]).    
 
Such attitudes cannot be dismissed lightly since we know that “othering” 
plays an important part in the generation of collective identities (Cohen, 
1991: 197).  However, this mechanism is not specific to the English and 
was far less conspicuous at the level of Parliamentary and political 
organization around the issue of the United Kingdom’s accession to the 
EEC where other issues were more important. 
 
Britain’s enduring ties to the Empire and Commonwealth were an 
obvious countervailing pull away from closer economic and political 
integration with countries of the European mainland.  This was 
particularly true of Prime Minister Harold Wilson, who after Labour’s 
general election victories of 1974 found himself at the head of a 
government reluctantly committed to a referendum on the re-negotiated 
terms of Britain’s involvement in the EEC.  Indeed Europe was 
something of a mystery to Wilson.  Bernard Donnoghue, one of Wilson’s 
policy advisors, felt that Wilson was ‘basically a north of England, non-
conformist, puritan…  The continental Europeans, especially from 
France and southern Europe were to him alien.  He disliked their rich 
food, genuinely preferring meat and two veg with HP sauce’ (cited in 
Hennessy, 2001: 365).  Speaking to the London Labour Mayors’ 
Association in 1974, Wilson argued that Britain’s ties to the 
Commonwealth were not merely a matter of sugar and butter: 
 
There are deep personal and family relationships for many of our people with 
countries in the Commonwealth.  I have 43 close relatives in Australia, 
descendents of my four grandparents, more than four times as many as I have in 
Britain.  I am not unique in this.  And in addition to family ties there are very 
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many who recall the response of the Commonwealth when Europe’s freedom was 
in danger, many who developed close personal friendships in the Commonwealth.  
I trust that our friends in the Community will not underrate this powerful feeling 
in Britain, or the importance of the Commonwealth relationship which we can 
bring into the Community with us (Wilson, 1974). 
 
For Wilson, Europe was equated with danger and threat, whilst the 
Commonwealth was a source of succor, and one made real through ties 
of family and friendship.  And the anxieties about loss flowed in both 
directions, particularly from New Zealand which was set to be the biggest 
Commonwealth loser if and when the UK joined the EEC.  A pamphlet 
written in 1971 by Tom Weal of the New Zealand Common Market 
Safeguards Campaign bore the famous picture of St Paul’s during the 
Blitz superimposed on a Union flag on its front cover.  The tone of the 
pamphlet was apocalyptic: 
 
Together we stand at the crossroads of history. The SECOND BATTLE OF BRITAIN 
is immanent.  In the mystical sense, am I to be that stranger from New Zealand 
standing on a broken arch of London Bridge to gaze upon the ruins of St Paul’s?’ 
(Weal, 1971) 
 
But whilst these Commonwealth ties were important in the 1960s and 
‘70s, they were not crucial in the emergence of a specifically English 
nationalism.  Of more lasting importance was the defence of 
Parliamentary sovereignty and its fusion with popular sovereignty 
through the referendum of June 1975.  Its was the prospect of the United 
Kingdom’s entry into the EEC which forced members of the public and 
political class alike to think about the ways in which they were governed.  
The last time people were forced to do this was during the Second World 
War – and now there was the real prospect of close economic integration 
with some of the very powers that had fought against Britain.  The 
greatest political resistance to European integration came from the 
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Labour Party, since at this stage, the Conservatives and the Liberals were 
pro-Europe.  Debate about accession to the EEC was initially focused 
around the passing of the European Communities Act in October 1971.  
Writing in that year, Ron Leighton, director of the Labour Party’s 
Committee for Safeguards on the Common Market, spelt out the fears of 
the left about the EEC.  Whilst some of the objections related to left-wing 
suspicion of the EEC as being pro-big business, the twin themes of 
sovereignty and history emerged too.  ‘Sovereignty,’ argued Leighton, ‘is 
not a reactionary concept.  It is our most precious possession, as those 
countries in the world without it today would testify’ (Leighton, 1971: 
13).  But sovereignty could not be understood in isolation from history.  
Leighton continued: 
 
Our present liberties and freedoms in Britain were fought for and achieved by our 
forefathers in a long struggle which included such milestones as Magna Carta, the 
Bill of Rights, the Chartist movement, the various reform bills, women’s suffrage, 
and so on.  Our present MPs have inherited these rights and liberties, and now 
they are custodians responsible for handing them on to future generations.  They 
certainly have no mandate to surrender or abandon our right to self-government 
and self-determination to the apparatus in Brussels and would never be forgiven 
for doing so (Leighton, 1971: 13). 
 
When Prime Minster Ted Heath duly signed the Treaty of Rome in 1972 
and the UK acceded to the EEC the following year, the novel issue of a 
popular referendum was placed on the political agenda by the so-called 
“Anti-Marketeers” in the Labour Party. It was this device that began the 
fusion Parliamentary and popular sovereignty on the issue of Europe.  
The Anti-Marketeers were drawn predominantly, but not exclusively, 
from the left-wing of the Labour Party.  Having lost the battle over 
accession on the floor of the Commons, this group, led by the likes of 
Peter Shore, Tony Benn and Barbara Castle, campaigned to make a 
referendum on the EEC Labour policy.  This policy was broadly 
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supported by party members and MPs, but would prove difficult for the 
leadership when Labour came to power in 1974.  But as Anthony Forster 
has pointed out, the notion of popular sovereignty inherent in a 
referendum sits strangely with the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty 
which was the ostensible goal of the Anti-marketeers (Forster, 2002: 92).  
Nevertheless, a referendum on continued UK involvement under 
renegotiated terms of accession was part of the Labour manifesto in both 
elections of 1974 and after their second victory of that year a date for a 
referendum was duly set for 6 June 1975. 
 
However, it was the outspoken ex-Conservative MP Enoch Powell who 
made some of the most explicit links between national identity and 
sovereignty during the referendum campaign.  Speaking on Radio Three 
in the run-up to the referendum, Powell – already habituated to 
defending the English people’s sovereignty against New Commonwealth 
immigrants – argued that ‘parliamentary sovereignty is the form in which 
we are accustomed to asserting our national independence,’ adding that 
Parliamentary sovereignty was also ‘the fact for which men have fought 
and died, that the laws in their country are made only by the institutions 
of their country and in Britain that they are made only by the 
parliamentary institutions of our country’ (Powell, 1975).  And even 
though many of the arguments on the left stemmed from a sceptical 
attitude towards the EEC’s capitalist and Christian Democratic 
credentials, even figures such as Tony Benn could comprehend the 
EEC’s lack of appeal in Britain through an understanding of the 
inviolability of Britain’s borders since 1066 and portray it as a re-
creation of the Holy Roman Empire (Benn, 1971). 
 
What emerged stronger out of these debates during the first half of the 
1970s was an understanding of Englishness founded upon and 
articulated around a sense of the uniqueness of Parliament, as well as its 
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historical formation, longevity and continuity throughout the travails of 
the twentieth century.  This continuity could not be understood by 
Continental Europeans who, in the words of the anti-Market National 
Referendum Campaign, were ‘more used to giving up their institutions 
than we are’ (National Referendum Campaign, 1975: 5).  These 
understanding of England’s past were turned into a populist issue by the 
referendum of 1975.  This unusual innovation in British politics was 
ostensibly to allow the people to decide this issue of supreme national 
importance.  However, it was also designed to preserve the Labour Party 
from splitting over the issue of Europe (Hennessy, 2001: 365).  In short, 
Prime Minister Wilson was far more concerned with Labour unity than 
European unity.  Thus to keep the government together the electorate 
found itself confronted with arguments that were presented as being of 
such national significance that only “the people” could decide.  To be 
sure the Anti-Marketeers failed in their objective of securing Britain’s 
withdrawal from the EEC, losing the referendum in June 1975 by a 
margin of almost 2:1 (Blair, 2005: 47). Ultimately, the Anti-Marketeers’ 
key argument that the referendum was about ‘whether or not we remain 
free to rule ourselves in our own way’ (National Referendum Campaign, 
1975: 2) did not carry as much force as the government-backed 
campaign for a Yes vote which downplayed the threat to sovereignty and 
emphasized material concerns: 
 
Today we are even more dependent on what happens outside.  Our trade, our jobs, 
our food, our defence cannot wholly be within our own control.  That is why so 
much of the argument about sovereignty is a false one…  If we came out the 
Community would go on taking decisions which affect us vitally – but we should 
have no say in them.  We would be clinging to the shadow of British sovereignty 
while its substance flies out of the window [emphases in original] (Britain in Europe, 
1975: 4). 
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And in a Britain where memories of wartime want still lingered, 
arguments about basic material prosperity – ‘Britain, as a country which 
cannot feed itself, will be safer in the Community which is almost self-
sufficient in food’ – were persuasive (Britain in Europe, 1975: 6). 
 
Nevertheless, these debates of the early 1970s gave political salience to a 
popular version of national identity linked to Parliamentary sovereignty.  
But there was a caveat; Parliament’s sovereignty extended beyond the 
borders of England, a legacy of the United Kingdom’s political 
development which helped conflate and confuse England and Britain.  
With England being what Arthur Aughey has termed ‘an absorptive 
patria’ (Aughey, 2007) Englishness and Britishness were still commonly 
merged.  It would take a further intensification of anti-European 
attitudes, plus the strengthening of nationalisms in other parts of 
Britain, to begin to disentangle English nationalism from the defence of 
British sovereignty. 
 
II 
The Conservative Party’s weakening commitment to European integration 
is well documented.  As Andrew Geddes points out, Conservative support 
for Europe was predicated on a ‘rather narrow trade-based idea of 
European integration that was unlikely to be adaptable to the ambitious 
programmes for political and economic integration which were launched 
in the 1980s’ (Geddes, 2004: 192).  Margaret Thatcher campaigned for a 
Yes vote in 1975 and although European affairs in the initial five years of 
her time as Prime Minister were dominated by the budget rebate, this 
was a difference of detail (admittedly one worth millions of pounds) 
rather than principle.  Indeed, with the Single European Act (SEA) of 
1987, it looked as if the Conservative Party was doing much to remake 
the European Community in Britain’s new-found neo-liberal image.  But 
the origins of what was now being dubbed “Euroscepticism” can be found 
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in Thatcher’s attempts to change the Conservative Party and Britain from 
1975 onwards.  As with Labour’s referendum in 1975, domestic concerns 
ultimately generated important attitudes towards European integration 
and again a concern with British sovereignty arose in the face of the 
process of European integration.  In asserting and defending British 
sovereignty, Thatcher not only hardened and deepened a split within the 
Conservative Party, but also deepened national divisions within the 
United Kingdom itself. 
 
In her attempt to radicalize and modernize both the Conservative Party 
and Britain, the EEC initially seemed to be on the right side of history for 
Thatcher.  The past – especially the Victorian era – was never a foreign 
country for Margaret Thatcher; in fact the past was Britain.  But it was a 
past that served as an inspiration for contemporary renewal.  ‘The time is 
ripe for a new radicalism’ argued Thatcher to her Party in 1977, but 
cautioned that her version of the past was not nostalgic, nor an attempt 
to turn back the clock to Britain’s imperial heyday: 
 
On the contrary, we are trying to start the clock up again, to move forward with 
Europe.  This is not going back to the nineteenth century, but trying to restore the 
economic and social momentum we had in the nineteenth century and adapt it to 
present needs (Thatcher, 1977a). 
 
Negative attitudes towards European integration ultimately developed 
out of the “battle of ideas” over the relationship between the state and 
individual in Britain, which were only latterly applied to the development 
of the European Community.  Thatcher outlined some of her early ideas – 
with the help of Sir Keith Joseph and the Centre for Policy Studies – in 
opposition during 1977.  The idea that ‘government should step in and 
replace organic and spontaneous relationships by regimentation from 
above’ argued Thatcher, ‘was alien to the Anglo-Saxon tradition’.  She 
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continued with her historical analysis of the role of the state in European 
history: 
 
The absolute monarchs which emerged in some European countries out of the 
feudal order considered it their duty to regulate and initiate.  If they did not 
encourage commerce and manufacture – they believed there would be none.  They 
never stopped to ask themselves whether their heavy hand did not in fact inhibit 
spontaneous growth (Thatcher, 1977b). 
 
All of this was designed to win over the Party and electorate to the neo-
liberal ideas and, like Wilson’s attitude towards Europe, was essentially 
driven by domestic concerns.  Importantly, the notion of individual 
sovereignty was from this point on added to the popular defence of 
Parliamentary sovereignty begun in the 1970s.  From May 1979 the 
Conservative Party sought to turn Thatcherite ideals into political and 
social reality.  With such an emphasis on the individual, it might have 
seemed as if the link between a putative nationalism and the institutions 
of state would weaken, but this was not the case.  As far back as 1977, 
The Times noted that ‘Mrs Thatcher’s assumptions are individualist and 
her individualism belongs to the English protestant Christian tradition 
(The Times, 5 July 1977).  But the rhetoric of “putting the Great back in 
Britain” for a long time obscured the Englishness of Thatcherism – at 
least in England.  But the distinction between Britain and the “historic 
nations” of the United Kingdom was always easier to make outside of its 
English core.  In Scotland in particular, the distinction became more 
acute as the 1980s wore on.  Andrew Marr noted that: 
 
What became known as Thatcherism was viscerally and intellectually opposed to the 
post-War Scottish consensus, characterised by the domination of the public sector 
and quasi-socialist tone in public life generally.  With its mass public housing, high 
union membership and struggling heavy industries, Scotland was a lot like 
England, only more so.  But its subtly different intellectual and political climate 
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made it much more resistant to the politics, if not the policies, of Thatcherism 
(Marr, 1995: 168). 
 
From 1987, Scots opinion formers and the electorate began to move away 
from the Conservative Party.  Responding to this growing disaffection, the 
Scottish Constitutional Convention issued a Claim of Right, arguing that 
‘we have a government which openly boasts its contempt for consensus 
and a constitution which allows it to demonstrate that contempt in 
practice’ (Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 23).  So the problem was 
not just Thatcherism and the Conservative Party alone, but Britain too.  
The Campaign for a Scottish Assembly endorsed the idea that ‘the United 
Kingdom is a political artifact put together at English insistence.  If it is 
to continue, it must work for its living and justify its existence’ 
(Constitutional Steering Group, 1988: 6).  The Poll Tax, initiated in 
Scotland one year ahead of the rest of the UK, only fuelled anti-
Conservatism and anti-Englishness (the two concepts being treated as 
almost synonymous). 
 
Whilst the Scots were chiseling Englishness out of the Conservative 
rhetoric of Britishness, changes to the European Community pushed the 
issue of sovereignty – Parliamentary and popular – back to the centre of 
political debate.  The logic of Thatcherism’s individualistic anti-
bureaucratism finally played out in the Bruges Speech of September 
1988 (Thatcher, 1988).  In this speech Thatcher was concerned to halt 
the erosion of national and individual liberty by what she saw as an 
encroaching, alien power.  Her subsequent views on the development of 
the European Community (EC) reveal not only the manifest superiority of 
the British system of government – ‘if I were an Italian, I might prefer 
rule from Brussels too’ (Thatcher, 1995: 742) – but also the linking of the 
British way of life and national character with those very institutions of 
government, worrying the Prime Minister that ‘British democracy, 
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parliamentary sovereignty, the common law, our traditional sense of 
fairness, our ability to run our own affairs in our own way’ might be 
‘subordinated to a remote European bureaucracy, resting on very 
different traditions’ (Thatcher, 1995: 743). 
 
Further developments within the member states of the EC during the late 
1980s, notably German re-unification, also revealed and contributed to a 
conflation of xenophobia and Eurosceptic ideas.  Margaret Thatcher’s 
meeting to discuss the German national character at Chequers in March 
1990 and Nicholas Ridley’s description of the EC as ‘German racket’ 
illustrated suspicions still resting on the experience of fighting Germany 
during the twentieth century (Ramsden, 2006: 405).  According to 
Thatcher, since 1871 Germany had been veering ‘unpredictably between 
aggression and self-doubt’ and containing post-War Germany within the 
framework of European unity was not a way to solve “the German 
problem” but was only bound to exacerbate it (Thatcher, 1995: 791).  The 
worst case scenario for Thatcher was a re-unified Germany in a 
strengthened EC (Volkery, 2009).  But even if Thatcher was somewhat 
isolated in her attitudes, as the decade closed, the tendency within the 
Conservative Party to view the EC as a threatening alignment of former 
foes grew stronger.  The European threat to Parliament’s sovereignty 
appeared to threaten the very warp and weft of popular life, as the 
regulation and harmonization required to create the Single Market 
impacted on the United Kingdom and was reported in the press in 
greater measure. 
 
When Thatcher was ousted as leader of the Conservatives in November 
1990, the leadership challenge was precipitated by divisions over the 
issue of Europe.  But despite the efforts of the pro-European wing of the 
Conservative Party to ameliorate the anti-European sentiments now 
commonplace in the Party, those ideas had set down firm roots.  This left 
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the new Prime Minister, John Major, to deal with a large and vociferous 
Eurosceptic bloc in the Party, just at the moment when the political 
project of European union was being negotiated at Maastricht.  And the 
issue of Europe continued to tear the Conservative Party apart during 
Major’s full term as Prime Minister between 1992-7.  Again the past was 
never very far beneath the surface of the debate on Europe, and the 
language was set in terms which recalled the wartime threat to Britain 
from Nazi Germany and its quisling allies.  Paul Johnson wrote in The 
Spectator that ‘what the row over the Maastricht Treaty has brought to 
the surface is the salient fact that Britain’s real enemy is not Germany 
but France’ where amongst the small number of politicians and 
fonctionnaires ‘hatred of Britain and the individual freedom it stands for 
is a religion’ (Johnson, 1992).  In language ironically resembling those in 
favour of a devolved Scottish parliament, Conservative Eurosceptics 
spoke out against the erosion of democracy entailed by being an under-
represented and poorly understood part of a centralizing political union.  
Thus the process of European integration heightened a sense of 
distinctiveness around the issue of sovereignty.  Writing in The European 
Journal, the publication of the Eurosceptic European Foundation, 
Stephen Hill elaborated a divide between Britons and Germans in 
relation to sovereignty, the law and rights, attitudes which had become 
habits of mind: 
 
…our constitution (which has evolved continuously for 781 years) is in an 
unwritten form and depends on duties.  Our monarch is surrounded by an aura of 
mystery that reflects the ineffable relationship between the metaphysical Form of 
Sovereignty and the manifest sovereign.  In Britain, we believe our liberty is 
protected in the belief of the Idea of Liberty itself…  Germans believe the exact 
opposite.  They accept that law is made by the president of the people and is 
worked out in advance and is written down.  Similarly, the constitution (they are 
on their fifth in 125 years) must be written down.  Their liberty, as they see it, is 
protected by their “Basic Rights” enshrined in a legal code (Hill, 1996:13). 
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Worse still, Eurosceptics believed that this un-English conception of 
political rights and freedoms was about to be imposed on England via the 
European Union.  Ahead of the 1996 Inter-Governmental Conference, 
leading Eurosceptics Bill Cash and Iain Duncan Smith accused 
Germany’s Chancellor Helmut Kohl of advocating ‘a system of 
authoritarian and bureaucratic European government which would 
extinguish the opportunity to disagree’ (Cash and Duncan Smith, 1996: 
39), precisely the curtailment of liberty that had been averted between 
1939-45.  This fear of German hegemony remained based on a view of 
European history:  ‘German fear of its past and other nations’ fear of 
Germany is not a secure base for a balanced operation in Europe’ 
claimed Cash and Duncan Smith, who argued that the “German 
Problem” had the potential to ‘destabilize Europe and the world well into 
the next millennium’ (Cash and Duncan Smith, 1996: 39). 
 
By 1996, this attitude of seeing Anglo-European relations in terms of a 
particular view of the past had become so ingrained that most significant 
Anglo-European interactions were characterized as conflicts.  This was 
particularly true in terms of the 1996 “Beef War” and the tabloid 
coverage of Euro96.  The debates about European integration of the late 
1980s and the 1990s had deepened the association made between the 
nation, the past and the defence of sovereignty.  It also added a dose of 
English individualism to the mix, allowing for the development of 
criticisms of the EU as a constraint on liberty, not as in the European 
understanding of the past, its guarantor.  Again, given the emphasis on 
defending Parliament’s sovereignty from the seemingly federalist direction 
of European integration, it was still too easy to equate England and 
Britain and treat these two entities as synonymous.  But although the 
content and contours of this nascent nationalism were emerging, the 
specific Englishness of this Euroscepticism was not yet evident to all 
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south of the Tweed and east of the Severn.  Nevertheless, by the time of 
the fall of Major’s Conservative government in 1997 the intellectual 
framework for an English nationalism based around Euroscpeticism was 
in place.   
 
III 
When New Labour came to power in 1997 one of their first and most 
significant actions was to devolve power to Scotland, Wales, London and 
– eventually – Northern Ireland.  The only attempt to create a devolved 
regional assembly in England – in the North East in 2004 - was a 
resounding failure.  But in the late 1990s, the asymmetrically devolved 
structure of the United Kingdom began to produce a sort of English 
resentiment nationalism of the type outlined by Liah Greenfeld (1992).  
Philip Resnick has referred to this type of nationalism as one 
characterised by “hubris” – ‘an overweening pride in one’s own national 
community’ usually found in the national majorities of formerly imperial 
states; an attitude which he contrasts with the ‘melancholy’ of national 
minorities (Resnick, 2008: 789-90).  In England the ideological content of 
a putative English nationalism had already formed around 
Euroscepticism, or at least Euroscepticism was broad enough to 
accommodate the opinions of those who resented bureaucratic 
regulation, open borders and foreign erosion of the United Kingdom’s 
sovereignty – all understood as “national decline”.  The expression of that 
ideology might best be summed up by combining Resnick’s two 
descriptors and concluding that English nationalism in the early twenty-
first century could be described as “hubristically melancholic”, where a 
nostalgia for the past combined with an increasingly organised and 
popular anti-European politics.  
 
In January 1998, four months after the successful referenda establishing 
devolution in Scotland and Wales, a Private Member’s Bill on the creation 
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of an English parliament was tabled by Teresa Gorman MP.  Gorman was 
a prominent Eurosceptic, one of the so-called “Euro Rebels” who had lost 
the whip in 1995 over the issue of the UK’s financial contribution to EU.  
Gorman might be described at this time as “reluctantly English”: she had 
no particular desire to see the United Kingdom divided up into its 
national constituents, fearing that this might make the UK easier to 
govern from Brussels’ point of view, but she felt that devolution had 
changed things. Gorman stated that despite calling for an English 
parliament, she was in fact a Unionist.  But New Labour’s policies had 
forced her hand and she demanded that the English receive ‘fair and 
equal treatment’, noting in passing that nine out of the twenty ministers 
in Blair’s Cabinet were Scottish or Welsh or represented Scottish and 
Welsh constituencies (Hansards, 16 January 1998: col. 596).  In those 
years immediately prior to the establishment of a parliament in Scotland 
and an Assembly in Wales, GK Chesterton’s lines about the people of 
England who have not spoken yet were given a good dusting off.  Indeed 
scholarly and popular interest in England and the English increased (see 
for example Jeremy Paxman’s 1998 bestseller, The English).  But whilst 
the Conservative and Unionist Party of Great Britain grappled with the 
pros and cons of establishing an English parliament after 1997, New 
Labour, with significant constituencies of support in Scotland, Wales and 
the urban centres of England, became the new Unionists, and developed 
notions of “inclusive” Britishness as a counterpoint to what they 
portrayed as “exclusive” Englishness of the Conservatives (see for 
example Gordon Brown in Prospect, April 2005).  There was one sense in 
which the Conservatives were exclusively English since their 
parliamentary representation at Westminster was confined exclusively to 
England between 1997 and 2001.  The election of 1997 initially pushed 
the two major parties further apart on the issue of Europe too.  The 
Conservatives deepened their Eurosceptic stance and in their party 
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leaders William Hague and Iain Duncan Smith, they had two Eurosceptic 
champions. 
 
At first, the contrast between the Conservatives and New Labour could 
not have been starker.  After the long years of Conservative 
Euroscepticism, New Labour seemed like a breath of fresh air blowing in 
from the Channel.  During its period of “modernization” in the 1980s and 
1990s, the Labour Party dropped its 1983 manifesto pledge to withdraw 
from the EEC.  Additionally, as the European Community under 
Commission President Jacques Delors began to regulate and harmonise 
its way towards the Single Market, its aims and objectives began to 
chime with a Labour Party itself reforming towards a “middle” or “third” 
way.  Blair himself was the most “European” of all the Prime Ministers 
since Heath, and early on in his first term of office he addressed the 
Assemblée Nationale in French (it would be hard to image Wilson, 
Callaghan, Thatcher or Major being able to pronounce rosbif let alone 
conduct a whole speech in another language).  During New Labour’s term 
in office, there were attempts to contain narratives of Britain’s past in a 
European framework, but ultimately the search for greatness 
emphasized the fact that past grandeur seemed unobtainable either 
within the context of European integration or as America’s junior partner 
(Gamble, 2003). 
 
Relations with European partners seemed utterly convivial at first.  
Speaking to Dutch dignitaries early on in his premiership, Tony Blair 
emphasized the long-term strength of Anglo-Dutch relations, stating that 
there had been amity between the nations for centuries despite a few 
‘naval misunderstandings’ (Blair, 1998).  Even though this was evidently 
a joke at the outset of his speech, the logic of subsuming European war 
and conflict to the safety of fraternal conflict also operated on large 
projects of commemoration – akin to Anderson’s notion of the 
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‘reassurance of fratricide’ (Anderson, 1991: 197).  The year 2005 marked 
the bicentenary of Britain’s victory over two unnamed EU partners at the 
Misunderstanding of Trafalgar.  Accordingly, Her Majesty the Queen and 
other dignitaries assembled at Portsmouth Harbour to see a re-
enactment of the famous naval disagreement between the Reds and the 
Blues.  In 1805, victory at Trafalgar secured the dominance of British sea 
power for over a century and was marked by the construction in London 
of a huge square commemorating the victory in the 1840s.  However the 
2005 commemorations at Portsmouth were one example of the dilution of 
Anglo-British greatness, reinforcing the notion that Britain may have 
won several wars, but it always seemed to be losing the peace. 
 
Beneath the initial bonhomie there appeared to be a serious commitment 
to British cooperation within the framework of European multilateralism, 
as evidenced by the constructive attitude displayed by the new British 
government during the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997 and 
the St Mâlo Agreement concluded between Britain and France in 1998.  
However, Blair was also conscious of the United Kingdom’s “special 
relationship” with the United States and after September 2001 
demonstrated the type of Atlanticist tendencies that appeared to 
vindicate all of General De Gaulle’s fears about the United Kingdom’s 
involvement in Europe. This pro-American attitude, combined with the 
United Kingdom government’s refusal to commit to the euro (a significant 
dimension of European integration stymied by the threat of a popular 
referendum on the matter) appeared to signal that the United Kingdom 
was still unwilling – or unable – to choose between America and Europe. 
 
It was the differing responses of the foreign ministries of Europe to the 
US-led invasion of Iraq which damaged Blair’s European credentials the 
most and put Britain back into the “awkward” camp when it came to 
matters European.  The initial invasion of 2003 pitted US, British and 
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Australian troops against the Iraqis: and US, British and Australian 
governments against those of France, Germany and Belgium.  The 
Anglophones had support from other European countries such as Spain, 
Italy, Denmark and some applicant states such as Poland.  It was this 
diplomatic dispute which led US Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld, to 
divide Europe into “old” and “new”, with Britain being in the latter camp.  
But there was another way of looking at this, and that was through the 
prism of a “core” and “non-core” Europe, with Britain definitely “non-
core”.  This idea was given its greatest popular expression by the German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas and his co-writers and signatories.  On 31 
May 2003, Habermas and his colleagues published a series of articles in 
various European newspapers (plus one in the US) denouncing the 
invasion of Iraq and thereby attempting to invoke a genuinely European 
public sphere, at least within “core Europe” (Habermas and Derrida, 
2005).  Habermas (and somewhat passively Derrida’s) contention was 
that ‘core Europe’ could be defined through what he called ‘the historical 
roots of a political profile’: in other words, what was distinctive about 
contemporary Europe – especially in contrast to the United States – was 
the product of Europe’s bellicose history and subsequent attempts to 
ensure that such calamities never took place again (Habermas and 
Derrida, 2005: 12).  By this reading of history, the US could never 
understand the pacific concerns that drove European integration; by 
extension, Britons could not really grasp this weltanshauung either.   
 
For Habermas, the anti-war demonstrations of 15 February 2003 were 
akin to a declaration of European independence and powerfully – if 
somewhat simplistically – linked the notion of “Europe” with the idea of 
“peace” (Habermas and Derrida, 2005: 10).  This conception was 
strikingly similar to the ideals of the European Movement of the late 
1940s.  One of the European Movements’ most ardent supporters was 
Winston Churchill.  Although pro-Europeans in England tried to remind 
 22 
their compatriots of Churchill’s pro-European sentiments, Churchill was 
more commonly associated with Britain’s wartime “finest hour”.  Indeed, 
by the turn of the Millennium, “the War” had become symbolic of 
Britain’s enduring sovereignty in the face of threats – both militaristic 
and pacific – from continental Europe, albeit operating in the context of 
considerable ignorance to the actualities of the past (BBC News, 10 
September 2000).  This version of the past which privileged Britain’s 
conflict with its continental neighbours was increasingly popularised 
through film, television, books, genealogy, commemoration and tourism 
(Ramsden, 2006: 363-92).   
 
At a political level, it was still hard to discern a mass nationalism that 
was explicitly English (the Campaign for an English parliament and the 
English Constitutional Convention had limited support: Bryant, 2008: 
670).  At a cultural level this was less true.  It was the display of the 
Cross of St George at international football tournaments which was the 
most obvious sign of this growing Englishness.  This widening of support 
for England was not necessarily accompanied by a deepening of English 
national identity (see Fenton, 2007; Abell et al, 2007).  But what the 
development of support for the England team did from the mid-1990s 
was to allow for a mass, popular expression of an identity which was 
exclusively and explicitly English rather than British; even if this identity 
was “non-political” in the sense that it was not linked to a programme of 
constitutional change.  However there were signs that, when it came to 
the issue of Europe, an English nationalism that combined post-imperial 
melancholia with anti-European sentiment was emerging. 
 
As noted by opinion pollsters back in 1975, most people did not vote for 
the UK’s continuing involvement in the EEC out of any strong sense of 
conviction, but because they felt there was no other option available to 
them (Boase Massimi Pollitt Partnership. 1975).  This loss of what Tom 
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Nairn has termed “greatness” – a fundamental aspect of Anglo-British 
identity which required the British state to project its power throughout 
the world (Nairn, 2002: 33) – informed much Euroscepticism.  Raising 
concerns about Britain’s power and freedom of action within an enlarged 
European Union, Quinten Davies asked ‘is the whole Union to be vetoed 
by Latvia or Malta?’ (Davies, 1996: 23).  The latter idea was especially 
galling: Malta had been part of the British Empire and it was one thing to 
give them all the George Cross for wartime bravery, but another thing to 
let them tell Britons what to do via the institutions of the European 
Union. 
 
In this sense, the European Union was itself a symbol of decline and 
could therefore be blamed for anything wrong with Britain, from 
bureaucratic waste to unregulated immigration.  It was on just such a 
platform that the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) was 
formed, with the party articulating its “Five Freedoms”, the principle one 
being freedom from the European Union (UKIP, 2004).  Formed in 1993 
as essentially a single issue party, UKIP’s main aim was to secure the 
United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union – the ultimate 
defence of British sovereignty and therefore the British way of life.  Two 
points in the creation of a political party committed to withdrawal from 
the EU are worth noting.  The first is that UKIP’s vision of the future was 
grounded in the past: leaving the EU would allow Britain to become ‘a 
normal, self-governing democracy… once again’ (UKIP, 1997) and that 
the EU would oblige Britain ‘to abandon the centuries old democratic 
and legal systems that have been embraced by countries throughout the 
world’ (UKIP, 2004).   
 
Although from its name and its anti-devolutionary policies one could 
conclude that this was a British party, its electoral strategies and 
successes – particularly in the 2004 European elections – lead to a 
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different conclusion.  UKIP concentrated its efforts in England and this is 
where all of its twelve seats were won.  Similarly, twenty-four of the 
Conservative’s twenty-seven seats won in that election were concentrated 
in England.  Although it would be incorrect to argue that Eurosceptic 
attitudes are only found in England, the 2004 elections do suggest that 
Euroscepticism is a bigger vote winner in England than in other parts of 
the United Kingdom.  It is also interesting to contrast the anti-European 
stance of this de facto English nationalist party with that of the Scottish 
National Party, for which European integration has become (officially at 
least) an opportunity rather than a threat: (Ichijo, 2004: 43-58).    In this 
sense, European integration guaranteed and augmented Scottish 
sovereignty in contrast to Westminster which was seen by nationalists as 
a threat.  Conversely, political Englishness still remained obscured in the 
language of the defence of British sovereignty.  By being ‘for British 
democracy, not Brussels bureaucracy’ (UKIP, 1997), UKIP continued the 
conflation of England and Britain through the defence of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, its history and traditions.  It could do no other.  For all the 
ways in which the defence of Parliamentary sovereignty had been 
augmented by popular sovereignty, Eurosceptics in England still had to 
defend the UK’s sovereignty against Europe whilst mounting a rear guard 
campaign against Scottish and Welsh secessionists; which ultimately 
meant a defence of Parliamentary sovereignty.  But defending sovereignty 
could be understood in different ways.  In the European elections of 
2009, the British National Party (BNP) also won two seats in England.  
BNP leader Nick Griffin articulated a defensive English nationalism when 
he claimed that his party was not racist, adding that  
 
There's a huge amount of racism in this country; overwhelmingly it is 
directed towards the indigenous British majority, which is one reason 
we've done so well in these elections…  The Labour Party, the Lib Dems 
and the Tories, by leaving the door to Britain open, have forced people to 
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turn to a party which speaks openly about the problem of immigration 
(BBC, 2009).   
 
In Powellite ways, the BNP merged anti-Europeanism and anti-
immigration in defence of sovereignty.  The structural nature of the 
United Kingdom’s integration into the European Union forced English 
populists within the UKIP and the BNP to speak the language of 
Britishness.  It is thus the politics of sovereignty surrounding debates 
about European integration which help explain the continuing conflation 
of “England” and “Britain” amongst groups which we might otherwise 
expect to articulate contemporary English nationalism. 
 
How this might play out in British politics remains to be seen.  The 
Conservative Party has advocated referenda on two Europeans issues in 
the last decade: the euro and the Lisbon Treaty.  This invocation of 
popular sovereignty is unusual for a party so committed to defending 
Parliamentary sovereignty.  But in campaigning for a No vote the 
Conservative Party will be able to draw on a significant stream of English 
popular nationalism and one where the nostalgic sentiment of September 
2009 which saw Vera Lynn top the charts might become an important 
political force with the ability to impact on the process of European 
integration in very significant ways. 
 
Conclusion 
The links between Euroscepticism and English nationalism are especially 
significant for several reasons.  The first is that debates about the United 
Kingdom’s accession to the EEC and its continuing level of involvement 
in the process of European integration focus attention on the role of 
sovereignty – particularly Parliamentary sovereignty – as a central 
element in English nationalism.  Furthermore, the somewhat esoteric 
doctrines, ideas and conventions surrounding Parliamentary sovereignty 
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have been given a popular dimension through the Eurosceptic promotion 
of referenda on this issue, thus beginning the process whereby 
Parliamentary sovereignty was merged with – and to some extent even 
superseded by – popular sovereignty.  Added to this during the 1980s 
was the notion of the sovereignty of individual as an economic being 
seeking freedom in the face of state bureaucracy.  And although 
Euroscepticism can demonstrate support throughout the United 
Kingdom, the differing strategies and polices of nationalist parties 
towards Europe mean that Euroscepticism finds its most comfortable 
home in England.  Additionally understandings of the past and the 
popular defence of Parliament’s sovereignty feed into each other and 
reinforce each other.  The result is that Euroscpeticism is in all but name 
English nationalism, but it is an English nationalism which still 
characteristically speaks the language of Britishness. 
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